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Separation, Politics and Judicial Activism
WALLACE MENDELSON*

It takes a united country to run a divided government...
-Clinton Rossiter
American government was conceived in fear. Haunted by the concentrated power of kings, we fractured' the power of popular government.
Fractured power of course means fractured responsibility-a vexing element in the American political system. To put it differently, the same
Separation of Powers with its corollary "checks and balances" that was
designed to impede evil government must pari passu impede good
government (however these moralistic terms may be defined). Separation
and democracy then have this in common: both are concerned with the use
and misuse of power; both are precautionary. The one, however, is purely
negative, overbroad, and non-selective. It blocks or hinders any use of
power, however exercised, for whatever end or purpose, wise or unwise,
good or bad. The other is principled and selective. It affirms and
legitimizes some uses of power, repudiating others. Separation and
democracy thus are mutually harmonious in some degree, beyond that they
are in tension.
The parliamentary system handles the riddle of governmental power
quite differently and, some insist, with more sophistication. It does not
seek safety in a mechanistic clash of separated forces. Rather it concentrates
power for effective action and holds that power closely and democratically
accountable. This largely eliminates what for us is a perennial quandary:
which of several shells hides the peas of power and responsibility? The
result, one suggests, is that parliamentary electorates have more confidence
in, and understanding of the governmental process than is customary in
this country even in good times. Perhaps in the long view we have relied
too much on self-operating, external mechanisms and too little on
ourselves-enjoying as we have a wide margin for error and inefficiency
thanks to great natural wealth and. our protective ocean moats. Expecting
the public sector to take care of itself, participating little more than
nominally in the democratic process, finding our chief satisfactions in the
*B.A. 1933, University of Wisconsin; LL.B. 1936, Harvard University; Ph.D: 1940,
University of Wisconsin; Professor of Government, University of Texas, Austin.
'Were we not here concerned only with the Separation of Powers, "splintered" would be
a more accurate term. For in addition to separating, we also bicameralized and federalized.
Accordingly we now have just over 200 major g(vernmental power centers-to say nothing of
thoifsands of "home-rule" (and other) counties, municipalities, school, and other special'

districts.
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private sector, we are generally disappointed and cynical with respect to
government. Typically we 'know" there must be deceit and venality in
any gap between what public men profess and what they produce. The fact
is the checks and balances of Separation were designed to make professed
programs difficult to implement. For to speak of checking and balancing-the terminology we learned as children to revere-is a sympathetic
way of referring to frustration and deadlock. It comes perhaps to this: the
Founders rejected "efficient" government with, so it seemed, a greater risk
of tyranny in favor of inefficient government (checked and balanced against
itself) with a better promise of safety and freedom. For the small, simple,
slow-moving, agrarian society of 1789, the choice was easy. Such a society
required very little government. Its needs could be served by machinery
which at best worked slowly, and even then perhaps only when supported
by a massive consensus of opinion so overwhelming as to neutralize the
built-in impediments. Though the simple world our Fathers knew has
long since passed away, their basic plan of government is still with us. We
have avoided tyranny and we have prospered: we have also made some
changes.
SEPARATION

AND

POLITICAL PARTIES

Not so long ago a scholar who would become President Woodrow
Wilson warned with respect to checks and balances:
The trouble with the theory is that government is not a machine, but
a living thing. It falls, not under the theory of the universe, but under the
theory of organic life. It is accountable to Darwin, not to Newton. It is
modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks, shaped to its
functions by the sheer pressure of life. No living thing can have its organs
offset against each other as checks, and live. On the contrary, its life is
dependent upon their quick cooperation, their ready response to the
commands of instinct or intelligence, their amicable community of
purpose. Government is not a body of blind forces; it is a body of men,
with highly differentiated functions, no doubt, in our modern day of
specialization but with a common task and purpose. Their cooperation is
indispensable, their warfare fatal. There can be no successful government
without leadership or without the intimate, almost instinctive, coordination of the organs of life and action.2
The coordinating device that Wilson seems to have contemplated was a
responsible party system.
Early in our national history Alexander
Hamilton, who thought our scheme of government far too impotent,
discovered that an extra-constitutional political party superimposed upon
the constitutional structure could in large measure circumvent Separation,
2W.
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and thus transform what Woodrow Wilson called an unworkable Newtonian machine into an effective Darwinian organism. 3 By bridging the
separated branches a strong political party, we learned, could hope to
harmonize and coordinate their sundered operations. Later we also
learned, that even the dominant party is not always a reliably strong and
effective coordinator. 4 When it is not, we lapse back to the frustration of
checks and the deadlock of balances. Thus it is that in the iong view the
history of American government seems a history of spasms. In weak party
eras (absent a crisis), i.e. when the Founder's Newtonian machine prevails,
Congress and the President are apt to be at loggerheads. Little then is to
be expected from them. In strong party eras (and usually in time of crisis)
the built-in friction diminishes. Then Congress and President generally
respond to accumulated problems with vigorous legislative programs.
There have been three such episodes in the twentieth century: the early
Wilson, the F.D.R., and the L.B.J. administrations. Wilson's bulging
reform program was the fruit of the Panic of 1907 and the high tide of the
Progressive Movement which, for a brief time, invigorated large segments
of both major parties. Years later the Great Depression gave Roosevelt the
leverage to create a potent new Democratic Party dedicated to reform. The
result of course was a massive New Deal. Yet by the 1950's F.D.R.'s party
had lost its vitality, as had the Republican Party long before. 5 A period of
torpidity followed in domestic affairs. Even the bright, new Kennedy
Administration failed miserably in Congress. Then the shock of the
assassination plus the enormous congressional majorities (including many
dedicated young men) that the Goldwater campaign gave the Democrats
enabled L.B.J. to push a massive reform program through Congress 6many elements of which President Kennedy had vainly urged. The period
of harmony lasted hardly two years. Since then it has been a matter of
Separation. As of now we have not even been able to adopt a viable
response to the energy crisis, the short run interests of the consumer
apparently prevailing in Congress check and balance what the White
House deems to be the long run needs of the nation.
Of course the Founding Fathers are only partially responsible for the
internal friction that plagues American government from time to time. The
growth of urbanism has magnified the problem. For in large measure a
modem President's constituency is urban; that of Congress is significantly
more oriented toward rural and small town interests. The reason for those
"two majorities" is plain. It begins with the unit rule that gives a state's

3

See P. ODEGARD & E. HELMS, AMERICAN POLITICS 30-36 (1947).
'See notes 12 & 24 infra.

6See text accompanying notes 24-25 infra.

6
The Vietnam War caused many to forget President Johnson's early legislative triumphs.
See R. HOFSTADTER, W. MILLER & D. AARON, THE UNITED STATES 846-53 (3rd ed. 1972).
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total electoral vote for president to the candidate who gets a majority of the
popular votes.
Thus the populous states with large electoral votes are particularly
important. The candidate who wins most or all of them, even by a hair,
will probably win the Presidency. Both parties realize this is so, and shape
their strategies of nomination and electioneering accordingly. They tend
to nominate men who come from the larger states, and who, in the
progression of their own careers, have made alliances with urban interest
groups and their representatives, such as labor unions, Negroes, and other
ethnic blocs. These are, by and large, groups that in their policy
preferences are conventionally described as "liberal": welfare minded,7
favoring civil rights legislation, and demanding of governmental services.
Thus, a presidential candidate who has substantial support in some fifteen
or twenty major metropolitan areas is virtually assured of victory. One
who fails to carry most of them has little, if any, chance of winning.
Many men of Congress on the other hand must answer largely or
exclusively to rural and small town America.
But that is only the
beginning of the matter. The non-urban element in Congress has been
greatly magnified by congressional organization and procedure, especially
the committee and seniority systems, the unique role of the House Rules
Committee, and perhaps the filibuster. The leaders of Congress of course
are committee chairmen who traditionally have been selected by mere
seniority without regard for merit, party loyalty or concern for presidential
policy.
Since seniority is most readily attained by those from "safe
districts," chairmanships have gone very disproportionately to Democrats
from the South or Republicans from the rural Midwest. 8 So favored, non
urban interests have long enjoyed a position not unlike the old English
"rotten boroughs." Thus, we have long had in effect a double gerrymander: rural interests being overrepresented in Congress; urban concerns
in the White House. The tensions thus generated are increased by other
phenomena. A President presumably, far more than members of Congress,
is conscious of his role in history. Thus generally, it seems in "domestic
affairs, he tends to take the broad and progressive... view; in world affairs,
the adventurous and cooperative. In the former, Congress tends to be more
parochial and desultory; in the latter, more cautious and nationalistic." 9
Indeed perhaps, with respect to the one we tend to vote our national ideals;
with respect to the other, our more immediate and mundane needs and biases.
In any event as a matter of historical experience, the congressionalexecutive relationship is less than fully harmonious. A famous historian
recently referred to it as "permanent guerrilla warfare" which to be sure
7
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See note 28 infra & text accompanying.

9C. Rossiter, President and Congress in the 1960's, in
POLITICS 105 (M.D. Irish ed. 1963).

CONTINUING CRISIS IN AMERICAN

1977]

SEPARATION OF POWERS

heats and cools periodically. The result of all these constitutional and
extra-constitutional stumble blocks is reminiscent of Calhoun's concurrent
majority system. For almost any well led, determined and not insignificant
minority in normal times can find one or more of many available checks
and balances to kill, maim, or delay virtually anything it finds seriously
objectionable.
Those who like uncluttered, logical lines of power and responsibility,
and especially those who are impatient for a new social order, find all this
at least close to unbearable. Their judgments typically rest, as is now
fashionable, not on comparison with any system known on earth, but vis-avis some never-never land in an ideal world. Others, perhaps more aware
of mankind's sad experience with government, find that among the world's
few free nations ours does not suffer by comparison; that history gives
promise of congressional and presidential cooperation often enough to
meet pressing needs; that the lulls between such creative episodes are in fact
healthful periods of gestation; that our tradition of government by
concurrent, i.e. extraordinary, majorities has not prevented experimentation or discussion. It has at most only slowed the process of change in
the interest of insuring a viable consensus behind public policy. 10 Or more
broadly, as Robert Dahl suggests, our political.
.... institutions, then, offer organized minorities innumerable sites in
which to fight, perhaps to defeat, at any rate to damage an opposing
coalition. Consequently, the institutions place a high premium on
strategies of compromise and conciliation, on a search for consensus. They
inhibit and delay change until there is wide support; they render
comprehensive change unlikely; they foster incremental adjustments. They
generate politicians who learn how to deal gently with opponents, who
struggle endlessly in building and holding coalitions together, who
doubt the possibilities of great change, who seek comprosmises. 11
THE JUDICIARY

We turn now to that other separated organ, the Supreme Court, in the
context of splintered political power and responsibility. It is clear that in
no other democratic system do judges play anything approaching the
governing role they play in the United States. Perhaps one cannot prove,
yet one surely may suspect, that this indecisive, fractured political system
invites the unique role of the American judiciary. It is said that power goes
to those who can use it. What follows here is a survey of some post-bellum
evidence to support these thoughts.
The Civil War and the "bloody shirt" thereafter virtually eliminated
the Democratic Party and the South as important forces in national
ISee S. Bailey, Our National Political Parties, in POLITICAL PARTIES, U.S.A. 4 (R.A.
Goldwin ed. 1964).
"R.

DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 329 (1967).
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politics. This left the Republican Party, initially a northern "and-slavery"
alliance of East and Midwest, in nominal control. But that sectional
combination was far from stable as the successive Granger, Greenback,
Alliance, Free Silver and Populist movements indicated. For these were
largely Midwestern agrarian revolts against the Eastern "money power." In
short East and West, at odds econcomically, were frozen in a "dominant"
political alliance. So constituted of incompatibles, the Republican Party
was hardly a dynamic instrument of government. Indeed a major part of
the litigation that reached the Supreme Court in this era reflected clashes
between businessmen and farmers (later labor), the chief allies in the
Republican coalition. The defeat of the great revolt that Bryan led in 1896
confirmed the inability of the Democratic Party to tear the unhappy West
from its sectional accord with the East and reestablish the ante-bellum
West-South Democratic coalition. 2 It may have been this special weakness
of the party system, combined with the normal contretemps of the
separated political branches that invited the judicial activism, once called
government by the judiciary, which began in 1890's.
The Supreme Court had resisted for a time under the leadership of
Chief Justice Waite in the face of persistent dissents. 3 Then it fell to with
vigor in 1895-1896. In a matter of months it killed the national income
tax,' 4 emasculated the Sherman Antitrust Act 5 as well as the Interstate
Commerce Commission, 16 and it approved the labor injuction17 as well as
Separate-But-Equal. 8
This old fashioned, largely economic activism
continued through 1935-1936, when it destroyed virtually the entire early
New Deal legislative program. 19
The election of 1936, hdwever, brought a major change in the nature of
the party system. The traditional, and long moribund, politics of sections
gave way to what was then called urban politics. 20 The election of 1932
was the last in which sectionalism played the dominant role. By 1936
voters had learned what the New Deal was. Ethnic and class-conscious
urbanism replaced "acreage" in the alignment of political party forces.
Many rural voters returned to the G.O.P. Most of the Midwestern wheat
counties, for example, were on their way back. But urbanites more than
made up the loss. Every city of 100,000 or more inhabitants turned to the
new Democratic Party, and with the sole exception of Grand Rapids,
"2As to the agrarian rebellion and Bryan's efforts, see P. ODEGARD & E. HELMS, AMERICAN
POLITICS 93-101 (1947).

sSee generally C.

MAGRATH, MORRISON

R.

WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER

(1963).

14pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
"5United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
16ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144 (1897).
17 1n re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
18Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
19For a listing of the cases since those cited in notes 14-18 supra,see THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1597-1768 (1973).
20 See A. HOLCOMBE, THE NEw PARTY POLITICS (1933).
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remained there until the Eisenhower years.2 1 The city masses had found a
political tool responsive to their needsl
The blatantly activist role that the Supreme Court had achieved under
moribund sectional politics apparently could not be maintained in the face
of a potent new party system. The "nine old men" surrendered. And in
short order the new Roosevelt Court repudiated all the activist innovations
of the 1890-1936 era, including, for example, liberty-of-contract, substantive
due process, the fair value doctrine, the labor injunction, dual federalism
and Separate-But-Equal.2 2 In a word, laissez-faire and racial segregation
lost their constitutional status. What new doctrines that were devised by the
23
Roosevelt Court were essentially doctrines of judicial restraint.
Mapp v. Ohio24, in 1961, seems appropriate to mark the advent of a
new judicial era, reflecting another political party impasse. By the time
Mapp was decided the G.O.P. had declined to abiding minority status.
Since 1928 it had not, and still has not, elected a President together with a
majority in both houses of Congress. By 1970 there were at least as many
Independents as Republicans. Meanwhile F.D.R.'s Democratic coalition
was disintegrating. The urban tension between "hard hat" labor on the
one side and blacks and intellectuals on the other was crucial. Indeed it was
a major source of George Wallace's strength and of G.O.P. survival. Yet
these groups, the Blacks, labor, and intellecutals, had been the core of
F.D.R.'s Democratic Party. Another phase of the same disintegration
process was black immigration to, and white flight from, the central cities.
This so polarized urban areas for a time that some suggested the major
element of future politics would be a conflict between suburbs and corecities. The South moreover was becoming less and less solidly Demo25
cratic.
As of 1960 troubles had been building for years, many of them
quickened by war. President Eisenhower's well know tranquilizing effect
had provided a brief, much needed, respite after a generation of crises: the
worst depression, the worst hot war, the worst cold war, the worst limited
war in American history. But the healing era, which James Reston called
the "era of prosperity and good feeling," could not last long. As Reston put
it when President Eisenhower retired:
He was popular because he was in tune with the spirit of the nation,
which, during his eight years in office, was generous and optimistic, but
not militant or experimental. He was criticized because he was not in tune
with the world-wide spirit of the age which was convulsive and revolu21

See S.

LUBELL, THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS 49-63 (1965).
See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra.
23See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Prudential Life Ins. Co. v.
Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Graves v. New York ex tel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
24367 U.S. 643 (1961).
See also note 34 infra & text accompanying.
25Much of the material in this paragraph comes from W. KEEFE, PARTIES, POLITICS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY IN AMERICA 143-58 (1972).
12
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tionary. This contrast between the spirit of the nation (which he helped to
26
create) and the spirit of the world is the heart of the Eisenhower story.
By the time of Mapp, America had joined the rest of the world. A mass of
accumulating problems could no longer be ignored. Galbraith's exposure
of poverty in The Affluent Society (1958) was followed by the Joint
Economic Committee's report on The Low Income Population and
Economic Growth (1959). Harrington's The Other America would soon
appear. The year preceding Mapp had brought the "sit-ins" and the
"freedom rides." CORE, SNICK, the White Citizens' Councils, and S.D.S.
had begun to organize. The first student demonstration has just occurred,
by accident, at Berkeley; the "silent generation" had passed into history.
President Kennedy had just been elected. His campaign had focused on
nine industrial states (New York, California, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois,
Michigan, Texas, Massachusetts and New Jersey) casting 237 of the 269
electoral votes necessary for election. His approach accordingly had
stressed the interests of urban voters. The pattern of his electoral victory
reflected the pattern of his campaign. 27 Yet the leaders of the 87th Congrbss
with whom Kennedy had to work focused in a different direction. No Senate
committee chairman came from any of the ten largest northern industrial
states, though these states had more than half our total population. Nine of
the sixteen chairmen came from the South. In the House, four of the twenty
chairmen came from safe urban districts. Nine of the others were from the
South; a tenth from the near South, Oklahoma, and others were from
small, largely non-urban states such as Montana, Nevada, Arizona and New
Mexico. 28 It could hardly be surprising that most of President Kennedy's
program to resolve long smoldering problems of an urban-industral nation
was blocked in Congress, a humilating defeat for Camelot. It was in this
29
era that some observers began talking about "the deadlock of democracy."
If for the unique circumstances already mentioned, President Johnson
enjoyed a period of stunning legislative success, it did not last long.
Meanwhile, the Vietnam War was bringing what eventually would be close
to the full disruption of the political system. Indeed, reviewing the 1960's,
Samuel Lubell suggests America had lost its capacity for self government.
Reasoned argument, compromise and accomodation, he thought, were
increasingly "shoved aside" in favor of polarization, confrontation, violence and a raw struggle for power. Lubbell, a careful political observer,
could see "no party coalition in command of a sufficiently stable majority
to advance a unifying set of policies." 30 Many on the left were convinced
6

2 Quoted in 2 T.
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27L. KOENIG, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 67 (1965).
2sF. GREENSTEIN, THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
29
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of the "irrelevance of American politics." 31 George Wallace on the far right
charged there was not a dime's worth of difference between the two major
parties, meaning presumably what the left meant: the parties were not
focusing on the crucial issues of the day. As Walter Lippmann, old and
conservative, saw the problem:
To many, it does not seem right that in this time of crisis our political
system should be failing to register and reflect the issues which torment
our people. What has happened, it would seem, is that the American
political system, which works so well in normal times, is operating
regardless32of and apart from the bitter war and the urban and racial crises
at home.
How little confidence voters had in either party, i.e. how out of touch with
reality the parties seemed, was reflected in an unprecedented increase in the
33
number of Independent voters and in ticket splitting.
And so again, by the time Mapp came down in the early 1960's, as in
the post-bellum era, a once useful political party alignment seems to have
lost touch with the times. Again we needed a restructuring of party forces.
Meanwhile the Newtonian disease, as in the 1890's, seems to have invited
larger scale judicial policy making: the phenomenon called Warren Court
34
activism.
ADDENDUM

Those with a taste for jurimetrics may want to consider the relative
frequency of Supreme Court vetoes of both state and federal legislation in
the four periods blocked out in the foregoing essay: The Waite Era, 18741

See Brownfield, The Irrelevance of American Politics, in
Perry & M. Seidler eds. 1971).
SlId. at 640.
3

33W.
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143-58 (1972).

3'The phenomenon called "Warren Court activism" did not begin in the complacent
1950's when Earl Warren became Chief Justice (1953). Rather, one suggests, it was part and
parcel of the flaming 1960's. Admirers of the Warren Court like to credit it with Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), treating that decision as an aspect of the later activist
upheaval. That will not do! Brown was decided by eight members of the "old" Court plus
the new Chief Justice only months after he took office. It has been plainly foreshadowed in
a unanimous opinion in Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). Moreover Brown, unlike
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), for example, was hardly an activist addition to the
Constitution; it was rather a return to the central, anti-racist, purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment as originally recognized in the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); and Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339
(1880). The difference between the Warren Court of the 1950's and the Warren Court of the
1960's is stupendous. See the statistics provided in the ADDENDUM, infra. Note also that on at
least eleven occasions the later Warren Court overruled the earlier one. See THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES,

S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1795-6 (1973). In this article the

term "Warren Court" refers to the quintessential, "mature" Warren Court as we knew it after
1960.
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1889; the Laissez-Faire Activist Era, 1890-1936; the Frankfurter Era,3 5 19371960; and the mature Warren Court Era,3 6 1961-1969.

Acts Invalidated
State Federal

7

Average
Invalidation
Per Year

Waite Restraint

(1874-1889)

8

4.3

Laissez-Faire
Activism

(1890-1936)

45

8.6

Frankfurter
Restraint

(1937-1960)

9

5.4

Mature Warren Court
Activism

(1961-1969)

14

16.2

1"Surely Mr. Justice Frankfurter fought harder and longer for judicial restraint than any
other member of the Court at least since 1938. He was persistently opposed by a strong,
activist
minority which sometimes attracted enough side votes to carry the day.
36
See note 34 supra.
37
These figures are derived from data in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, S.
Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 1597-1768 (1963).

